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Abstract
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the de-facto standard inter-domain routing protocol on the
Internet. However, it is well known that BGP is vulnerable to a variety of types of attacks, and that
a single misconﬁgured or malicious BGP speaker could result in large scale service disruption. We
ﬁrst summarize a set of security goals for BGP, and then propose Pretty Secure BGP (psBGP) as a new
security protocolachievingthese goals. psBGP makes use ofa centralized trust modelfor authenticating
AutonomousSystem(AS)numbers, andadecentralizedtrust modelfor verifyingtheproprietyof IP preﬁx
origination. We compare psBGP with S-BGP and soBGP, the two leading security proposals for BGP.
Our analysis suggests that psBGP provides a better balance between security and practicality than
either S-BGP or soBGP: it signiﬁcantly reduces the complexity of preﬁx onwership veriﬁcation in S-
BGP and soBGP, although in theory offering somewhat less security; and psBGP offers more security
than soBGP in terms of AS number authenticationand AS PATH veriﬁcation, albeit requiring expensive
digital signature operations. Our performance analysis using real world BGP data suggests that psBGP
is practical with respect to the number of certiﬁcates to be stored and to be updated per AS. We also
raise a number of issues of independent interest about the design of S-BGP and soBGP.
1 Introduction and Motivation
The Internet consists of a number of Autonomous Systems (ASes), each of which consists of a number of
routers under a single technical administration (e.g., sharing the same routing policy). The Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) [40] is the de facto standard inter-domain routing protocol for exchanging routing informa-
tion between ASes on the Internet. It is well-known that BGP has many security vulnerabilities [29, 35],
for example: AS numbers and BGP speakers (routers running BGP) can be spoofed; BGP update messages
can be tampered with; and false BGP update messages can be spread. One serious problem is that a single
misconﬁgured or malicious BGP speaker may poison the routing tables of many other well-behaved BGP
speakers by advertising false routing information (e.g., see [9]). Examples of consequences include denial
of service (i.e., legitimate user trafﬁc cannot get to its ultimate destinations) and man-in-the-middle attacks
(i.e., legitimate user trafﬁc is forwarded through a router under the control of an adversary).
Many solutions [43, 29, 31, 19, 47, 2, 24] have been proposed for securing BGP. S-BGP [28, 29] is one
of the earliest security proposals, and probably the most concrete one. S-BGP makes use of strict hierarchi-
cal public key infrastructures (PKIs) for both AS number authentication and IP preﬁx ownership veriﬁcation
(i.e., verifying which blocks of IP addresses are assigned or delegated to an AS). Besides computational
costs, many people consider S-BGP to be impractical because of the viewpoint that requiring strict hierar-
chical PKIs makes it difﬁcult to deploy across the Internet (e.g., [3]). Our viewpoint is slightly different and
we consider that the two PKIs used in S-BGP have different practicalities, as explained below.
Agreeing in part with an important design decision made in S-BGP, we suggest that it is practical to
build a centralized PKI for AS number authentication because: 1) the roots of the PKI are the natural trusted
authorities forASnumbers, i.e., the Internet Assigned NumberAuthority (IANA)ortheInternet Corporation
of Assigned Numbers and Names (ICANN) and the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), hereinafter IANA;
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1and 2) the number of ASes on the Internet and its growth rate are relatively manageable, making PKI
certiﬁcate management feasible. For example, based on the BGP data collected by the RouteViews project
[34], there are in total about 17 884 ASes on the Internet as of August 1, 2004. This number has grown by
an average of 190 (157 removed and 347 added) per month since January 1, 2004.
However, it would appear to be extremely difﬁcult to build a centralized PKI for verifying IP preﬁx
ownership given the complexity, if not impossibility, of tracing how existing IP address space is allocated,
delegated, and tracing all changes of IP address ownership in part due to the large number of preﬁxes in
use and frequent organization changes (e.g., corporations splitting, merging, bankruptcy, etc.). As pointed
by Aiello et al. [2], it is exceptionally difﬁcult to even approximate an IP address delegation graph for the
Internet. Therefore, it may well be impossible to build a centralized PKI mirroring such a complex and
unknown delegation structure. To quote from a study by Atkinson and Floyd [3] on behalf of the Internet
Architecture Board (IAB): “a recurring challenge with any form of inter-domain routing authentication is
that there is no single completely accurate source of truth about which organizations have the authority to
advertise which address blocks”.
In contrast, soBGP [47] proposes use of a web-of-trust model for authenticating AS public keys and a
hierarchical structure for verifying IP preﬁx ownership. While a web-of-trust model has strong proponents
for authenticating user public keys within the technical PGP community, it is not clear if it is suitable for
authenticating public keys of ASes which are identiﬁed by AS numbers strictly controlled by IANA; thus it
is questionable if any entity other than IANA should be trusted for signing AS public key certiﬁcates. With
respect toIP preﬁxownership veriﬁcation, soBGPmakes use ofastrictly hierarchical structure similarto that
of S-BGP. Preﬁx delegation structures might be simpliﬁed in soBGP by using ASes instead of organizations
as entities, however, it is not clear if there are difﬁculties in practice to do so since IP addresses are usually
delegated to organizations not to ASes [2]. We suggest that soBGP, like S-BGP, faces extreme difﬁculty in
tracing changes of IP address ownership in a strict hierarchical way. Thus, both S-BGP and soBGP have
made architectural design choices which arguably lead to practical difﬁculties.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper, we present a new proposal for securing BGP, namely Pretty Secure BGP (psBGP), based on
our analysis of the security and practicality of S-BGP and soBGP, and in essence, combining their best
features. Our objective is to provide a reasonable balance between security and practicality. psBGP makes
use of a centralized trust model for authenticating Autonomous System (AS) numbers, and a decentralized
trust model for verifying the propriety of IP preﬁx origination which is in line with the recommendation of
IAB [3]. Our analysis suggests that psBGP provides a better balance between security and practicality than
either S-BGP or soBGP: it signiﬁcantly reduces the complexity of S-BGP and soBGP in preﬁx ownership
veriﬁcation, although in theory offering somewhat less security; and it offers more security than soBGP in
AS number authentication and AS PATH (see §2.2) veriﬁcation, albeit requiring expensive digital signature
operations. Another advantage of psBGP is that it can successfully defend against threats from uncoordi-
nated, misconﬁgured or malicious BGP speakers in a practical way. The major architectural highlights of
psBGP are as follows (see §3 for other details and Table 4.4 for a summary comparison).
1) psBGP makes use of a centralized trust model for AS number authentication. Each AS obtains a
public key certiﬁcate from one of a number of the trusted certiﬁcate authorities, e.g., RIRs, binding an AS
number to a public key. We suggest that such a trust model provides perfect authorization of AS number
allocation and best possible authenticity of AS public keys. Without such a guarantee, an attacker may be
able to impersonate another AS to cause service disruption.
2) psBGP makes use of a decentralized trust model for verifying the propriety of IP preﬁx ownership.
2Each AS creates a preﬁx assertion list consisting of a number of bindings of an AS number and preﬁxes,
one for itself and one for each of its peering ASes. An assertion is proper if it is consistent among the
preﬁx assertion lists of peering ASes. We consider this approach to be practical because it reﬂects existing
AS peering relationships and common practices (e.g., ingress ﬁltering [15]). In this way, we distribute the
extremely difﬁcult task of tracing IP address ownership across all ASes on the Internet, albeit introducing
some additional security risk. Assuming reasonable due diligence in tracking IP address ownership of direct
peer ASes, and assuming no two ASes in collusion, a single misbehaving AS originating improper preﬁxes
will be detected because they will cause inconsistency with the preﬁx assertions made by its peering ASes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes notation, discusses BGP threats, and
summarizes BGP security goals. psBGP is presented in Section 3, and compared with S-BGP and soBGP in
Section 4. Security and performance of psBGP are analyzed in Section 5 and 6 respectively. A brief review
of related work is given in Section 7. We conclude in Section 8.
2 BGP Security Threats and Goals
Here we deﬁne notation, discuss BGP security threats, and summarize a number of security goals for BGP.
2.1 Notation
A and B denote entities (e.g., an organization, an AS, or a BGP speaker). X or Y denotes an assertion which
is any statement. An assertion may be proper or improper. We avoid use of the term true or false since in
BGP, it is not always clear that a statement is 100% factual or not. An assertion is proper if it conforms to
the rules governing the related entity making that assertion. We use the following notation:
S,si S is the complete AS number space; currently S = {1,...,216}. si is an AS number; si ∈ S.
P,fi P is a set of all possible IP address preﬁxes. fi is an IP preﬁx; fi ⊂ P.
T an authority of S and P, e.g., T ∈ RIRs.
pk pk = [s1,s2,...,sk] is an AS PATH; s1 is the ﬁrst AS inserted onto pk.
m m = (f1,pk) is a BGP route (a selected part of a BGP UPDATE message).
peer(si) a set of ASes with which si establishes a BGP session on a regular basis. More speciﬁcally, a
given AS si may have many BGP speakers, each of which may establish BGP sessions with
speakers from many other ASes. peer(si) is the set of all other such ASes.
kA,kA one of A’s public and private key pairs.
{m}A digital signature on message m generated with A’s private key kA.
(kA,A)kB a public key certiﬁcate binding kA to A, signed by B using kB.
(kA,A)B equivalent to (kA,A)kB when the signing key is not the main focus.
(fi,si)A a preﬁx assertion made by A that si owns fi.
fA
i ,fB
i possible different preﬁxes asserted by A and B related to a given AS.
2.2 BGP Security Threats
BGP faces threats from both BGP speakers and BGP sessions. A misbehaving BGP speaker may be mis-
conﬁgured (mistakenly or intentionally), compromised (e.g., by exploiting software ﬂaws), or unauthorized
(e.g., by exploiting a BGP peer authentication vulnerability). A BGP session may be compromised or unau-
thorized. We focus on threats against BGP control messages without considering those against data trafﬁc
(e.g., malicious packet dropping). Attacks against BGP control messages include, for example, modiﬁca-
tion, insertion, deletion, exposure, and replaying of messages. In this paper, we focus on modiﬁcation and
3insertion (hereinafter falsiﬁcation [4]) of BGP control messages; deletion, exposure and replaying are be-
yond the scope of this paper. Deletion appears indistinguishable from legitimate route ﬁltering. Exposure
might compromise conﬁdentiality of BGP control messages, which may or may not be a major concern [4].
Replaying is a serious threat and can be handled by setting expiration time for a message, however it seems
challenging to ﬁnd an appropriate value for an expiration time.
There are four types of BGP control messages: OPEN, KEEPALIVE, NOTIFICATION, and UPDATE.
The ﬁrst three are used for establishing and maintaining BGP sessions with peers, and falsiﬁcation of them
will very likely result in session disruption. As mentioned by Hu et al. [24], they can be protected by a point-
to-point authentication protocol, e.g., IPsec [26]. Weconcentrate on falsiﬁcation of BGP UPDATEmessages
(hereinafter, often referred to simply as BGP messages) which carry inter-domain routing information and
are used for building up routing tables.
A BGP UPDATE message consists of three parts: withdrawn routes, network layer reachability infor-
mation (NLRI), and path attributes (e.g., AS PATH, LOCAL PREF, etc.). Due to space limitations, we omit
discussion of how to protect withdrawn routes. NLRI consists of a set of IP preﬁxes sharing the same char-
acteristics as described by the path attributes. NLRI is falsiﬁed if an AS originates a preﬁx not owned by that
AS, or aggregated improperly from other routes. Examples of consequences include denial of service and
man-in-the-middle attacks. There are two types of AS PATH: AS SEQUENCE or AS SET. An AS PATH
of type AS SEQUENCE consists of an ordered list of ASes traversed by this route. An AS PATH of type
AS SET consists of an unordered list of ASes, sometimes created when multiple routes are aggregated. Due
to space limitations, we focus on the security of AS SEQUENCEin this paper. (Note AS SET is less widely
used on the Internet. Forexample, as of August 1, 2004, only 23 of 17884 ASesoriginated 47 of 161796 pre-
ﬁxes with AS SET.) An AS PATH is falsiﬁed if an AS or any other entity illegally operates on an AS PATH,
e.g., inserting a wrong AS number, deleting or modifying an AS number on the path, etc. Since AS PATH is
used for detecting routing loops and used by route selection processes, falsiﬁcation of AS PATH can result
in routing loops or selecting routes not selected otherwise. We are interested in countering falsiﬁcation of
NLRI and AS PATH. We assume there are multiple non-colluding misbehaving ASes and BGP speakers in
the network, which may have legitimate cryptographic keying materials. This non-colluding assumption is
also made by S-BGP and soBGP, explicitly or implicitly.
2.3 BGP Security Goals
Weseek todesign secure protocol extensions toBGPwhich can resist the threats as discussed above. Aswith
most other secure communication protocols, BGP security goals must include data origin authentication and
data integrity. In addition, veriﬁcation of the propriety of BGP messages is required to resist falsiﬁcation
attacks. Speciﬁcally, the propriety of NLRI and AS PATH should be veriﬁed. We summarize ﬁve security
goals for BGP (cf. [28, 29]). G1 and G2 relate to data origin authentication, G3 to data integrity, and G4
and G5 to the propriety of BGP messages.
G1. (AS Number Authentication) It must be veriﬁable that an entity that uses an AS number si as its own
is in fact an authorized representative of the AS to which a recognized AS number authority assigned
si.
G2. (BGP Speaker Authentication) It must be veriﬁable that a BGP speaker, which asserts an association
with an AS number si, has been authorized by the AS to which si was assigned by a recognized AS
number authority.
G3. (Data Integrity) It must be veriﬁable that a BGP message has not been illegally modiﬁed en route.
4G4. (Preﬁx Origination Veriﬁcation) It must be veriﬁable that it is proper for an AS to originate an IP
preﬁx. More speciﬁcally, it is proper for AS s1 to originate preﬁx f1 if 1) f1 is owned by s1; or 2) f1
is aggregated from a set F of preﬁxes such that f1 ⊆ F, i.e., ∀fx ⊆ f1,fx ⊆ F1.
G5. (AS Path Veriﬁcation) It must be veriﬁable that an AS PATH (pk = [s1,s2,...,sk]) of a BGP route
m consists of a sequence of ASes actually traversed by m in the speciﬁed order, i.e., m originates
from s1, and has traversed through s2,...,sk in order.
3 Pretty Secure BGP (psBGP)
psBGP makes use of a centralized trust model for authenticating AS numbers and AS public keys. RIRs
are the root trusted certiﬁcate authorities. Each AS s is issued a public key certiﬁcate (ASNumCert), signed
by one of the RIRs, denoted by (ks,s)T. An AS with an ASNumCert (ks,s)T creates and signs two data
structures: a SpeakerCert (k0
s,s)ks binding a public key k0
s to s; and a preﬁx assertion list (PAL), listing
preﬁx assertions made by s about the preﬁx ownership of s and s’s peers. PALs is an ordered list: the
ﬁrst assertion is for s itself and the rest are for each of s’s peers ordered by AS number. Figure 1 illus-
trates the certiﬁcate structure used in psBGP. We next describe psBGP with respect to ﬁve security goals,
corresponding to G1-G5 above.
3.1 AS Number Authentication in psBGP
Root AS Number Authorities￿
T ￿ is an￿  RIR￿
ID=AS# =￿ s￿
public key=￿ k￿ s￿
Signed by ￿ T￿
ASNumCert￿
(f￿
s￿ ,    s)￿
(￿ f￿ 1￿ ,  s￿ 1￿ )￿
...￿
(f￿ n￿ ,  s￿ n￿ )￿
Signed  using ￿ k￿ s￿
PAL￿
ID=AS#=￿ s￿
public key=￿ k￿
'￿
s￿
SpeakerCert￿
Signed using ￿ k￿ s￿
Figure 1: psBGP Certiﬁcate Structure
Following S-BGP and soBGP, we make use of a centralized PKI [42]
for AS number authentication, with four root Certiﬁcate Authorities
(CAs), corresponding to the four existing RIRs. When an organi-
zation B applies for an AS number, besides supplying documents
currently required (e.g., routing policy, peering ASes, etc.), B ad-
ditionally supplies a public key, and should be required to prove the
possession of the corresponding private key [42, 1]. When an AS
number is granted to B by an RIR, a public key certiﬁcate (ASNum-
Cert) is also issued, signed by the issuing RIR, binding the public key
supplied by B to the granted AS number. An AS number s is called
certiﬁed if there is a valid ASNumCert (ks,s)T, binding s to a public
key ks signed by one of the RIRs. The proposed PKI for authenticat-
ing AS numbers is practical for the following reasons. 1) The roots of the proposed PKI are the existing
trusted authorities of the AS number space, removing a major trust issue which is probably one of the most
difﬁcult parts of a PKI. The root of a PKI must have control over the name space involved in that PKI.
Thus, RIRs are the natural and logical AS number certiﬁcate authorities, though admittedly non-trivial (but
feasible) effort might be required for implementing such a PKI. 2) The number of ASes on the Internet and
its growth rate are relatively manageable (see §6 - Table 2). Considering there are four RIRs, the overhead
of managing ASNumCerts should certainly be feasible as large PKIs are currently commercially operational
[21].
To verify the authenticity of an ASNumCert, an AS must have the trusted public key (or certiﬁcate) of
the signing RIR. These few root trusted public key certiﬁcates can be distributed using out-of-band mecha-
nisms. ASNumCerts can be distributed with BGP UPDATE messages. An ASNumCert is revoked when the
corresponding AS number is not used or reassigned to another organization. Issues of revocation, though
1If s1 does not own f1 and ∃fx ⊆ f1 such that fx * F, then s1 overclaims IP preﬁxes, which is considered to be a type of
falsiﬁcation.
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revocation is a well-studied issue, if albeit still challenging (e.g., see [1]). So far, we assume that every
AS has the public key certiﬁcates of RIRs and can obtain the ASNumCerts of any other ASes if and when
necessary.
There is much debate on the architecture for authenticating the public keys of ASes in the BGP security
community, particularly on the pros and cons of using a strict hierarchical trust model vs. a distributed trust
model, e.g., a web-of-trust model. We make the use of a strict hierarachical trust model with depth of one
for authenticating AS numbers and their public keys since it is not clear if a web-of-trust model is suitable
here. Some of the issues with a web-of-trust model are discussed in Appendix 1, e.g., trust bootstrapping,
trust transitivity, vulnerability to a single misbehaving party [33, 41].
3.2 BGP Speaker Authentication in psBGP
An AS may have one or more BGP speakers. A BGP speaker must be authorized by an AS to represent
that AS to establish a peer relationship with another AS. In psBGP, an AS with a certiﬁed ASNumCert
issues an operational public key certiﬁcate shared by all BGP speakers within the AS, namely SpeakerCert.
A SpeakerCert is signed using the private key of the issuing AS, corresponding to the public key in the
AS’s ASNumCert (see Figure 1). A SpeakerCert is an assertion made by an AS that a BGP speaker with
the corresponding private key is authorized to represent that AS. SpeakerCerts can be distributed with BGP
UPDATE messages.
We consider three design choices for BGP speaker authentication: 1) each BGP speaker is issued a
unique public key certiﬁcate; 2) group signatures (e.g., see [7]) are used, i.e., each BGP speaker has a
unique private key but shares a common public key certiﬁcate with other speakers in the same AS; or 3)
all BGP speakers in a given AS share a common public-private key pair. We propose the latter for its
simplicity and practicality. Choice 1) provides stronger security but requires more certiﬁcates, and discloses
BGP speaker identities. Such disclosure may introduce new competitive security concerns [46]. Choice 2)
provides stronger security, requires the same number of certiﬁcates, and does not disclose BGP identities,
but involves a more complex system.
The private key corresponding to the public key of a SpeakerCert is used for establishing secure connec-
tions with peers (§3.3), and for signing BGP messages. Therefore, it must be stored in the communication
device associated with a BGP speaker. In contrast, since the private key corresponding to the public key of
an ASNumCert is only used for signing a SpeakerCert and a PAL, it need not be stored in a BGP speaker.
Thus, compromising a BGP speaker only discloses the private key of a SpeakerCert, requiring revocation
and reissuing of a SpeakerCert, without impact on an ASNumCert. This separation of ASNumCerts from
SpeakerCerts provides a more conservative design (from a security viewpoint), and distributes from RIRs to
ASesthe workload of certiﬁcate revocation and reissuing resulting from BGPspeaker compromises. In sum-
mary, an ASNumCert must be revoked if the corresponding AS number is re-assigned or the corresponding
key is compromised. A SpeakerCert must be revoked if a BGP speaker in that AS is compromised, or if that
AS decides for other reasons to reissue it (e.g., if the private key is lost).
3.3 Data Integrity in psBGP
To protect data integrity, BGP sessions between peers must be protected. Following S-BGP, psBGP uses
IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [27] with null encryption for protecting BGP sessions. Since
many existing BGP speakers implement TCP MD5 [22] with manual key conﬁgurations for protecting BGP
sessions, it must be supported by psBGP as well. In psBGP, automatic key management techniques can
be implemented to improve the security of TCP MD5 as each BGP speaker has a public-private key pair
6(common to all speakers in that AS).
3.4 Veriﬁcation of Preﬁx Origination in psBGP
When an AS si originates a BGP UPDATE message m = (f,[si,...]), another AS needs to verify if it is
proper for si to originate a route for a preﬁx f. As stated in §2.3 (G4), it is proper for si to originate a route
for preﬁx f if: 1) si owns f; or 2) si aggregates f properly from a set F of preﬁxes carried by a set of routes
si has received.
3.4.1 Veriﬁcation of Preﬁx Ownership in psBGP
Facing the extreme difﬁculty of building an IP address delegation infrastructure (recall §1), we propose a
decentralized approach for verifying the propriety of IP address ownership, and more speciﬁcally by using
consistency checks. Our approach is inspired by the way humans acquire their trust in the absence of a
trusted authority: by corroborating information from multiple sources.
In psBGP, each AS si creates and signs a preﬁx assertion list (PALsi), consisting of a number of
tuples of the form (IP preﬁx list, AS number), i.e., PALsi = [(f
si
i ,si),(f
si
1 ,s1),...,(fsi
n ,sn)], where
∀1 ≤ j 6= i ≤ n,sj ∈ peer(si) and sj < sj+1. The ﬁrst tuple (f
si
i ,si) asserts that si owns f
si
i ; the rest are
sorted by AS number, and assert the preﬁx ownership of si’s peers. (f
si
j ,sj) (sj 6= si) asserts by si that sj
is a peer of si and sj owns preﬁx f
si
j if f
si
j 6= ∅. Otherwise, it simply asserts that sj is a peer of si.
As a new requirement in psBGP, each AS is responsible for carrying out some level of due diligence
ofﬂine: for the safety of that AS and of the whole Internet, to determine what IP preﬁxes are delegated to
each of its peers. We suggest the effort required for this is both justiﬁable and practical, since two peering
ASes usually have a business relationship (e.g., a trafﬁc agreement) with each other, allowing ofﬂine direct
interactions. For example, si may ask each of its peer sj to show the proof that fj is in fact owned by sj.
Similar due diligence might have been taken by service providers for implementing ingress ﬁltering [15] on
the Internet. Publicly available information about IP address delegation may also be helpful.
Two assertions (fi,si),(f0
i,s0
i) made by two ASes are comparable if they assert the preﬁx ownership of
a given AS, i.e., si = s0
i and the asserted preﬁxes are non- empty, i.e., fi,f0
i 6= ∅; and are incomparable
otherwise, i.e., they assert the preﬁx ownership of different ASes or one of the asserted preﬁxes is an empty
set. Two comparable assertions (fi,si) and (f0
i,si) are consistent if fi = f0
i; and are inconsistent if fi 6= f0
i.
Let n be the number of si’s peers. (fi,si) is k-proper if there exist some ﬁxed number k(2 ≤ k ≤ n+1)
of consistent assertions of (fi,si) made by si or si’s peers. Requiring k = n + 1 means that the assertion
(fi,si) made by si and all of its peers must be consistent for (fi,si) to be proper; this provides maximum
conﬁdence in the correctness of (fi,si) if the condition is met. However, it is subject to attacks by a single
misbehaving AS. For example, if ∃sj ∈ peer(si), and sj makes a false assertion (f
sj
i ,si) inconsistent with
(f
si
i ,si), then (f
si
i ,si) will not be veriﬁed as proper, orwill be veriﬁed as improper, although it might indeed
be proper. From the perspective of assertion list management, the greater k is, the larger preﬁx assertion lists
will grow, and the more updates of preﬁx assertion lists will be required since a change to an AS number si
or a preﬁx fi requires the update of all PALs making an assertion about si or fi. Moreover, there are a large
number of ASes which have only one peer. For example, as of August 1, 2004, there were 6619 ASes which
have only one peer based on one BGP routing table collected from the RouteViews project [34]. Requiring
k ≥ 3 will prevent these ASes from originating authorized preﬁxes.
Tobegin with, wesuggest k = 2in psBGP, i.e., (f
si
i ,si)is proper if there exists any single sj ∈ peer(si)
such that sj make an assertion (f
sj
i ,si) which is consistent with (f
si
i ,si). When verifying (f
si
i ,si), an AS
checks its consistency with the preﬁx assertion related to si made by each of si’s peers until a consistent
one is found, or no consistent assertion is found after all relevant assertions made by si’s peers have been
7checked. In the former case, (f
si
i ,si) is veriﬁed as proper; in the latter case, it is veriﬁed as improper. For
simplicity, the consistency among the preﬁx assertions related to si made by si’s peers amongst themselves
is not checked. A non-aggregated route (f,[si,...]) originated by si is veriﬁed as proper if (f
si
i ,si) is
proper and f ⊆ f
si
i .
psBGP assumes that no two ASes are in collusion. AS si and sj are said in collusion if they make
factually false but consistent assertions related to si’s preﬁx ownership. Note that a false preﬁx assertion
made by sj about a remote AS sk, i.e., sj / ∈ peer(sk), will not be checked when the self preﬁx ownership
assertion by sk is veriﬁed. Thus, a misbehaving AS sj is only able to cause inconsistency with the own
preﬁx ownership assertion by one of sj’s peers. If ∀sj ∈ peer(si), sj issues (f
sj
i ,si) inconsistent with
(f
si
i ,si), (f
si
i ,si) will be veriﬁed as improper by other ASes, even if it might be actually proper. This is the
case when misbehaving ASes form a network cut from si to any part of the network. It appears impossible
to counter such an attack, and many other techniques can also be used to deny the routing service of si, e.g.,
link-cuts [6], ﬁltering, or packet dropping. Note that an attacker in control of a BGP speaker in AS sj is
unable to issue valid false preﬁx assertions if the private key of sj’s ASNumCert is not compromised.
3.4.2 Veriﬁcation of Aggregated Preﬁxes
Suppose si owns IP preﬁx fi. When receiving a set of routes with a set of preﬁxes F = {fj}, the BGP
speciﬁcation [40] allows si to aggregate F into a preﬁx fg to reduce routing information to be stored and
transmitted. We call fj a preﬁx to be aggregated, and fg an aggregated preﬁx. si can aggregate F into fg if
one of the following conditions holds: 1) ∀fj ⊆ fg,fj ⊆ fi; or 2) ∀fj ⊆ fg,fj ⊆ F.
In case 1), si must own fi which is a superset of the aggregated preﬁx fg. Most likely, fi will be the
aggregated preﬁx, i.e., fg = fi. This type of aggregation is sometimes referred to as preﬁx re-origination.
From a routing perspective, preﬁx re-origination does not have any effect since trafﬁc destined to a more
speciﬁc preﬁx will be forwarded to the re-originating AS and then be forwarded to the ultimate destination
from there. From a policy enforcement perspective, preﬁx re-origination does have an effect since the
AS PATHofan aggregated route isdifferent from any ofthe AS PATHsof the routes to be aggregated. Since
AS PATH is used by the route selection process, changing AS PATH has an impact on route selections.
From a security perspective, preﬁx re-origination is no different than normal preﬁx origination since the
aggregated preﬁx is either the same as, or a subset of, the preﬁx owned by the aggregating AS. Therefore,
the aggregated route fg can be veriﬁed by cross-checking the consistency of si’s preﬁx assertion list with
those of its peers (§3.4.1).
In case 2), si does not own the aggregated preﬁx fg. Therefore, fg cannot be veriﬁed in the same way
as for preﬁx re-origination. To facilitate veriﬁcation of the propriety of route aggregation by a receiving
AS, psBGP requires that the routes to be aggregated be supplied by the aggregating AS along with the
aggregated route. This approach is essentially similar to that taken by S-BGP. Transmission of routes to be
aggregated incurs additional network overhead, which is something BGP tries to reduce. However, we view
such additional overhead to be relatively insigniﬁcant given that modern communication networks generally
have high bandwidth and BGP control messages account for only a small fraction of subscriber trafﬁc. The
main purpose of route aggregation is to reduce the size of routing tables, i.e., reducing storage requirements;
note that this is preserved by psBGP.
3.5 Veriﬁcation of AS PATH in psBGP
There is no consensus on the deﬁnition of “AS PATH security”, and different security solutions of BGP
deﬁne it differently. In S-BGP, the security of an AS PATH is interpreted as follows: for every pair of ASes
on the path, the ﬁrst AS authorizes the second to further advertise the preﬁx associated with this path. In
8soBGP, AS PATH security is deﬁned as the plausibility of an AS PATH, i.e., if an AS PATH factually exists
on the AS graph (whether or not that path was actually traversed by an update message in question).
Since AS PATH is used by the BGP route selection process, great assurance of the integrity of an
AS PATH increases the probability that routes are selected based on proper information. While the BGP
speciﬁcation [40] does not explicitly state that AS PATH is used for route selection, it commonly is in prac-
tice (e.g., by Cisco IOS). Without the guarantee of AS PATH integrity, an attacker may be able to modify
an AS PATH is a such way that it is plausible in the AS graph and is also more favored (e.g., with a shorter
length) by recipient ASes than the original path. In this way, a recipient AS may be misled to favor the
falsiﬁed route over any correct routes. As a result, trafﬁc ﬂow might be inﬂuenced. Thus, we believe that it
is insufﬁcient to verify only the existence/non-existence of an AS PATH, and it is desirable to obtain greater
assurance of the integrity of an AS PATH; we acknowledge that the cost of any solution should be taken
into account as well. In what follows, we deﬁne AS PATH security according to the original deﬁnition of
AS PATH [40], as “an ordered set of ASes a route in the UPDATE message has traversed”.
We choose the S-BGP approach with the improvement of the bit-vector method by Nicol et al. [37] (see
next paragraph) for securing AS PATH in psBGP, since it ﬁts into the design of psBGP and provides greater
assurance of AS PATH integrity with reasonable overhead. Hu et al. [24] propose a secure path vector
protocol (SPV) for protecting AS PATH using authentication hash trees with less overhead than S-BGP.
psBGP does not use the SPV approach since it has different assumptions than psBGP. For example, SPV
uses different public key certiﬁcates than psBGP.
Let ni = |peers(si)| be the number of peers of si. Given mk = (f1,[s1,s2,...,sk]), a psBGP speaker
si (1 ≤ i ≤ k −1) generates a digital signature {f1,[s1,...,si],vi[ni]}si where vi[ni] is a bit vector of bit-
length ni, with one bit corresponding to each peer in si’s preﬁx assertion list (§3.4.1). If si intends to send a
routing update to a peer sj, it sets the bit in vi[ ] corresponding to sj. In this way, a message sent to multiple
peers by a BGP speaker need be signed only once. For sk+1 to accept mk, sk+1 must receive the following
digital signatures: {f1,[s1],v1[n1]}s1,{f1,[s1,s2],v2[n2]}s2,...,{f1,[s1,s2,...,sk],vk[nk]}sk.
4 Comparison of S-BGP, soBGP, and psBGP
We compare the different approaches taken by S-BGP, soBGP, and psBGP for achieving the BGP security
goals listed in §2.3. Table 4.4 provides a summary. We see that psBGP falls somewhere between S-BGP and
soBGP in several of the security approaches and architectural design decisions, but makes distinct design
choices in several others.
4.1 AS Number Authentication
Both S-BGPand psBGPuse acentralized trust model forauthenticating ASnumbers, which isdifferent from
the web-of-trust model used by soBGP. The difference between the AS number authentication of psBGP and
S-BGP is that S-BGP follows the existing structure of AS number assignment more strictly than psBGP. In
S-BGP, an AS number is assigned by IANA to an organization and it is an organization that creates and
signs a certiﬁcate binding an AS number to a public key (thus, a two-step chain). In psBGP, an ASNumCert
is signed directly by IANA (depth=1), and is independent of the name of an organization. Thus, psBGP
has less certiﬁcate management overhead than S-BGP, requiring less number of certiﬁcates. In addition,
some changes in an organization X may not require revoking and reissuing the public key certiﬁcate of the
AS controlled X. For example, if X changes its name to Y but the AS number s associated with X does
not change, psBGP does not need to revoke the ASNumCert (ks,s)T. However, in S-BGP, the public key
9certiﬁcates (kX,X)T,(ks,s)kX might be revoked, and new certiﬁcates (kY ,Y )T,(k0
s,s)kY might be issued.
4.2 BGP Speaker Authentication
In both S-BGP and soBGP, a public key certiﬁcate is issued to each BGP speaker, while psBGP uses one
common public key certiﬁcate for all speakers within one AS. Thus, psBGP requires fewer BGP speaker
certiﬁcates (albeit requiring secure distribution of a common private key to all speakers in an AS).
Data Integrity
S-BGPuse IPsec forprotecting BGPsession and data integrity. Both soBGPand psBGPadopt this approach.
TCP MD5 [22] is supported by all three proposals for backward compatibility. In addition, automatic key
management mechanisms can be implemented for improving the security of TCP MD5.
4.3 Preﬁx Origination Veriﬁcation
Both S-BGP and soBGP propose a hierarchical structure for authorization of the IP address space; although
S-BGP traces how IP addresses are delegated among organizations, while soBGP only veriﬁes IP address
delegation among ASes. It appears that soBGP simpliﬁes the delegation structure and requires fewer cer-
tiﬁcates for veriﬁcation; however, it is not clear if it is feasible to do so in practice since IP addresses are
usually delegated between organizations, not ASes. In psBGP, consistency checks of PALs of direct peers
are performed to verify if it is proper for an AS to originate an IP preﬁx. Therefore, psBGP does not involve
veriﬁcation of chains of certiﬁcates (instead relying on ofﬂine due diligence). We note that while psBGP
does not guarantee perfect security of the authorization of IP address allocation or delegation, as intended
by S-BGP and soBGP, as discussed in (§1), it is not clear if the design intent in the latter two can actually be
met in practice.
4.4 AS PATH Veriﬁcation
Both S-BGP and psBGP verify the integrity of AS PATH based on its deﬁnition in the BGP speciﬁcation
[40]. In contrast, soBGP veriﬁes the plausibility of an AS PATH. Thus, S-BGP and psBGP provide stronger
security of AS PATHthan soBGP, at the cost of digital signature operations which might slow down network
convergence.
Goal S-BGP soBGP psBGP
G1: AS Number centralized decentralized centralized
Authentication (multiple levels) (with trust transitivity) (depth=1)
G2: BGP Speaker one certiﬁcate one certiﬁcate one certiﬁcate
Authentication per BGP speaker per BGP speaker per AS
G3: Data Integrity IPsec or TCP MD5 IPsec or TCP MD5 IPsec or TCP MD5
G4: Preﬁx Origination centralized centralized decentralized
Veriﬁcation (multiple levels) (multiple levels) (no trust transitivity)
G5: AS PATH Veriﬁcation integrity plausibility integrity
Table 1: Comparison of S-BGP, soBGP, and psBGP approaches for achieving BGP security goals.
105 Security Analysis of psBGP
Weanalyze psBGPagainst the listed security goals from §2.3. The analysis below clariﬁes how ourproposed
mechanisms meet the speciﬁed goals, and by what line of reasoning and assumptions. While we believe
that mathematical “proofs” of security may often be based on ﬂawed assumptions that fail to guarantee
“security” in any real-world sense, they are nevertheless very useful, e.g., for ﬁnding security ﬂaws, for
precisely capturing protocol goals, and for reducing ambiguity, all of which increase conﬁdence. We thus
encourage such formalized reasoning for lack of better alternatives.
Proposition 1 psBGP provides AS number authentication (G1).
Proof Outline: For an AS number s to be certiﬁed, psBGP requires an ASNumCert (ks,s)T. Since T
controls s, and is the trusted guardian of AS numbers (by assumption), any assertion made by T about s is
proper. Thus (ks,s)T is proper. In other words, s is an AS number certiﬁed by T, and ks is a public key
associated with s certiﬁed by T. More formally2, (T controls s) ∧ (ks,s)T ⇒ (ks,s) is proper.
Proposition 2 psBGP provides BGP speaker authentication (G2).
Proof Outline: For a BGP speaker r to be accepted as an authorized representative of an AS s, psBGP
requires an ASNumCert (ks,s)T, a SpeakerCert (k0
s,s)ks, and evidence that r possesses k0
s. By Proposition
1, (ks,s)T proves that s is an AS number certiﬁed by T and ks is a public key associated with s certiﬁed
by T. Similarly, (k0
s,s)ks proves that k0
s is a public key associated with s certiﬁed by s. Evidence that r
possesses k0
s establishes that r is authorized by s to represent s. Thus, the Proposition is proved. More
formally, (T controls s) ∧ (ks,s)T ⇒ (ks,s) is proper; (ks,s) is proper ∧ (k0
s,s)ks ⇒ (k0
s,s) is proper;
(k0
s,s) is proper ∧ r possesses k0
s ⇒ r is authorized by s.
Proposition 3 psBGP provides data integrity (G3).
Proof Outline: psBGP uses the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [26, 27] with null encryption
for protecting BGP sessions, and relies upon IPsec ESP for data integrity.
Before presenting Proposition 4, we establish two Lemmas.
Lemma 1 Assume that ∀si ∈ S,∃sj ∈ peer(si) such that sj carries out reasonable due diligence to create
a proper preﬁx assertion (f
sj
i ,si) (A1); and that no two ASes are in collusion (A2), then psBGP provides
reasonable assurance of preﬁx ownership veriﬁcation, i.e., a preﬁx assertion (f
si
i ,si) that is actually proper
will be veriﬁed as such; otherwise not.
Proof Outline: Suppose (f
si
i ,si) is proper. Since ∃sj ∈ peer(si) which makes a proper assertion (f
sj
i ,si)
(by assumption A1), then (f
si
i ,si) is consistent with (f
sj
i ,si) since two proper assertions must be consistent.
Thus, (f
si
i ,si) will be veriﬁed as proper because there exists a preﬁx assertion from si’s peer sj, (f
sj
i ,si),
which is consistent with (f
si
i ,si).
Suppose (f
si
i ,si) is improper. To show that (f
si
i ,si) will not be veriﬁed as proper, we need to show that
there does not exist (f
sj
i ,si), sj ∈ peer(si), such that (f
sj
i ,si) is consistent with (f
si
i ,si). ∀(f
sj
i ,si),sj ∈
peer(si), if sj carries out due diligence successfully, then (f
sj
i ,si)is proper and will be inconsistent with the
improper (f
si
i ,si). If sj misbehaves or its due diligence fails to reﬂect actual IP ownership, then (f
sj
i ,si) is
2Here we adapt BAN-like notation, modiﬁed for our purpose (cf. [8, 16, 18]).
11improper. We consider it to be a collusion of sj and si if (f
sj
i ,si) and (f
si
i ,si) are improper but consistent.
This case is ruled out by assumption A2. Thus, an improper preﬁx assertion (f
si
i ,si) will be veriﬁed as
improper since there does not exist animproper assertion which isconsistent with(f
si
i ,si)without collusion.
This establishes Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 psBGP provides reasonable assurance of IP preﬁx aggregation veriﬁcation.
Proof Outline: Let fg be a preﬁx aggregated by AS sx from a set of routes {mi = (fi,pi)|pi = [si,...]}
received by sx. psBGP requires that for fg originated by sx to be veriﬁed as proper, sx must either own a
preﬁx fx such that fg ⊆ fx (veriﬁed by Lemma 1), or provide evidence that sx has in fact received {mi}
and fg ⊆ ∪{fi}. Valid digital signatures from each AS on pi can serve as evidence that sx has received {m}
(see Proposition 5). If fg ⊆ ∪{fi}, then sx aggregates fg properly. If sx cannot provide required evidence,
sx’s aggregation of fg is veriﬁed as improper. This establishes Lemma 2.
Proposition 4 psBGP provides reasonable assurance of IP preﬁx origination veriﬁcation, i.e., an AS si’s
origination of a preﬁx f is veriﬁed as proper if f is owned by si or is aggregated properly by si from a set
of routes received by si. Otherwise, si’s origination of f is veriﬁed as improper.
ProofOutline: Lemma1allows veriﬁcation ofthepropriety ofpreﬁxownership. Suppose (f
si
i ,si)isveriﬁed
as proper, i.e., f
si
i is veriﬁed to be owned by si. If si owns f, then f ⊆ f
si
i . In psBGP, si’s origination of
f is veriﬁed as proper if f ⊆ f
si
i . If f * f
si
i , psBGP requires that si provide proof that f is aggregated
properly from a set of received routes (see Lemma 2). If si does not own f and si does not provide proof
of the propriety of preﬁx aggregation, psBGP veriﬁes si’s origination of f as improper. This establishes
Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 psBGP provides assurance of AS PATH veriﬁcation (G5).
Proof Outline: Let mk = (f1,pk) be a BGP route, where pk = [s1,s2,...,sk]). Let ri (1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1) be
a BGP speaker in si which has originated (i = 1) or forwarded (2 ≤ i ≤ k − 1) mi to si+1. In psBGP, the
integrity of pk implies that mk has traversed the exact sequence of s1,s2,...,sn. In other words, there does
not exist i (2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) such that si−1 didn’t send (f1,[s1,...,si−1]) to si.
By way of contradiction, assume that it is possible in psBGP that (f1,[s1,...,sk]) is accepted by a BGP
speaker rk+1 and there exists i (2 ≤ i < k) such that si−1 didn’t send (f1,[s1,...,si−1]) to si. psBGP
requires that for [s1,s2,...,sk] to be accepted by rk+1, ∀i (1 ≤ i < k), ri+1 has received a valid digital
signature {p1,[s1,...,si],vi[ ]}si where the bit in vi[ ] corresponding to si+1 is set. {p1,[s1,...,si],vi[ ]}si
serves as a signed assertion that si does send that routing update to si+1. This contradicts the above assump-
tion. Thus, Proposition 5 is established.
The above results establish the desired psBGP security properties, and are summarized by Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (psBGP Security Property) psBGP achieves the following ﬁve security goals: AS number au-
thentication (G1), BGP speaker authentication (G2), data integrity (G3), IP preﬁx origination veriﬁcation
(G4), and AS PATH veriﬁcation (G5).
6 Performance Analysis of psBGP
We use BGP data collected by the RouteViews project [34] to estimate the number of ASNumCerts, Speak-
erCerts, and PALs that are required by psBGP on the Internet, and their monthly changes. We retrieved one
12BGP routing table of the ﬁrst day of each month from January to August 2004. Despite likely incomplete-
ness of the RouteViews data set, it is one of most complete data repositories publicly available, and has been
widely used in the BGP community. We present our preliminary results of performance analysis for psBGP,
speciﬁcally, the stability of certiﬁcate structures used in psBGP.
6.1 ASNumCerts and SpeakerCerts
We observed in total 17 8843 ASes as of August 1, 2004. One ASNumCert is required per AS. In the worst
case, an AS may need to store the ASNumCert of every AS on the Internet; in this case, 17 844 ASNum-
Certs would be stored. The same holds for SpeakerCerts. However, more efﬁcient certiﬁcate distribution
mechanisms (e.g., see [1, 30]) may be used; further discussion is beyond the scope of present paper.
The monthly number of ASes has grown an average of 190 since January 1, 2004, with an average
of 347 ASes added and 157 ASes removed (see Table 2). When an AS number is added or removed, the
corresponding ASNumCert must be issued or revoked by an RIR. Thus, four RIRs between them must issue
an average of 347 new ASNumCerts and revoke an average of 157 existing ASNumCerts per month. This
would certainly appear to be manageable in light of substantially larger PKIs existing in practice (e.g., see
[21]). Note the issuing and revocation of a SpeakerCert is performed by an AS, not an RIR.
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug
Start of Month 16 554 16 708 16 879 17 156 17 350 17 538 17 699 17 884
Removed during Month 153 137 155 174 138 179 164 N/A
Added during Month 307 308 432 368 326 342 349 N/A
Table 2: AS Number Dynamics from January 1 to August 1, 2004
6.2 Preﬁx Assertion Lists (PALs)
Each AS issues a PAL, which might be large if the number of peers or the number of preﬁxes assigned to
a peer is large. To be distributed with BGP UPDATE messages whose size is limited to 4096 bytes, a large
PAL must be split into multiple smaller ones. For simplicity, we consider one PAL per AS in our analysis.
Thus, in the worst case, each AS needs to store 17 884 PALs.
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug
Start of Month 148 903 148 014 151 174 156 019 157 925 160 818 155 118 161 796
Stable During Month 143 200 144 422 146 139 151 481 153 171 148 280 151 436 N/A
Stable During Jan-Aug 119 968 119 968 119 968 119 968 119 968 119 968 119 968 N/A
Removed During Month 5 703 3 592 5 035 4 538 4 754 12 538 3 682 N/A
Added During Month 4 814 6 752 9 880 6 444 7 647 6 838 10 360 N/A
Table 3: IP Preﬁx Dynamics from January 1st to August 1st, 2004
A preﬁx assertion list PALsi must be changed (removed, added, or updated) if: 1) the AS number si
changes (i.e., removed or added); 2) an IP preﬁx owned by si changes; 3) si’s peer relationship changes, i.e.,
a peer is removed or added; or 4) an IP preﬁx changes which is owned by one of si’s asserted peers (i.e., a
peer whose preﬁx ownership is asserted by si). Table 3 depicts the dynamics of preﬁxes, Figures 2-(a) and
(b) illustrate AS peer relationships and AS preﬁx delegation, respectively, based on July 2004 data.
3AS numbers used by IANA itself are not counted.
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Figure 2: AS Peer Relationships and Preﬁx Delegation
We study the number of changes of preﬁx assertions (PAs) required for each AS based on the two routing
tables of July 1 and August 1, 2004. Each preﬁx addition or removal is counted once (i.e., resulting in one
PA addition or removal) if the AS number of the AS owning that preﬁx does not changes. If an AS number
is newly added (or removed) during the month, all additions (or removals) of the preﬁxes owned by that AS
are counted once as a whole.
In §6.2.1, we present the projected PA additions, removals, and the combined PA changes for ASes as
a result of the changes of their own AS numbers or IP preﬁxes. In §6.2.2, we present the projected PA
additions, removals, and the combined PA changes for ASes as a result of the changes of their peers’ AS
numbers or preﬁxes. We separate PA additions from removals because we consider that PA additions should
be performed with high priority to minimize service outage, while PA removals can be performed with low
priority without impact. In §6.2.3, we present the projected PA changes of all ASes.
6.2.1 ASes Changing their Own AS Numbers or Preﬁxes
We count the number of preﬁx assertion changes for each AS as a result of addition/removal of its own AS
number or preﬁxes, as described above. We then count the number of ASes with a given number of PA
additions, removals, and the combined changes respectively. We plot the number of PA additions versus the
number of ASes with that number of PA additions in Figure 3(a), and the same for PA removals in Figure
3(b). The combined PA changes versus the number of ASes with those speciﬁed PA changes are illustrated
in Figure 4. Note that in Figure 4, there is one AS which needs 4 936 PA changes. This AS (701) added
4 924 preﬁxes and removed 12 preﬁx during the month.
6.2.2 ASes whose Peers Changing their AS Numbers or Preﬁxes
Here we project the number of PA changes for ASes as a result of their asserted peers changing their AS
numbers or preﬁxes. Let t ≥ 1 be the exact number of peers for a given AS si, let n be our desired number
of peers asserting preﬁx ownerships for si, and let m be the actual number of asserting peers of si which we
will choose in the AS topology graph for our analysis. If t ≥ n, we set m = n since we desire n asserting
peers and this number is possible. Otherwise, set m = t since only t peers are available to make assertions.
We study four scenarios based on a given AS topology derived from the July 2004 dataset, and a desired
value of n. (n = 1): for each AS, there is exactly m = 1 peer asserting preﬁx ownerships for that AS;
(n = 2): for each AS, there are m = 2 peers asserting preﬁx ownerships for that AS if it has two or more
peers, otherwise, set m = 1; (n = 3): for each AS, there are m = 3 peers asserting preﬁx ownerships for
that AS if it has three or more peers; otherwise, set m = t; (n = all): for each AS, all m = t of its peers
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Figure 3: Projected PA additions and removals for ASes as a result of changing their own AS numbers or preﬁxes,
based on July 2004 data. In (a), point (x=8,y=28) indicates that 28 ASes need 8 PA additions.
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Figure 4: Projected PA changes for ASes as a result of changing their own AS numbers or preﬁxes, based on July
2004 data
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Figure 5: Projected PA additions for ASes as a result of their asserted peers adding preﬁxes, or newly appearing,
based on July 2004 data.
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Figure 6: Projected PA removals of ASes as a result of their asserted peers removing their AS numbers or preﬁxes,
based on July 2004 data.
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Figure 7: Projected PA removals of ASes as a result of their asserted peers changing their AS numbers or preﬁxes,
based on July 2004 data.
16assert preﬁx ownerships for that AS. According to these scenarios, Figures 5, 6, 7 illustrate PA additions,
removals and the combined changes for ASes whose asserted peers change their AS numbers or preﬁxes
during the month. We can see that more ASes require more preﬁx assertion changes as n increases (i.e.,
more asserting peers are desired).
6.2.3 Preﬁx Assertion List Stability
Table 4 depicts the projected PAL dynamics based on the data set of July 2004. The total number of ASes
observed during July 2004 is 18048, including 17884 ASes observed on August 1, 2004 and 164 removed
during July 2004. We can see that the more peers asserting the preﬁx ownership of other ASes, the more PA
changes required. We recommend the scenario n = 2, where an AS has only m = 2 of its peers asserting
its preﬁx ownerships even if it has more than two peers. that only peer will assert its preﬁx ownership. For
m = 2, it provides a level of redundancy in the case that one of the two asserting peers fails to carry out its
due diligence.
We see from Table 4 that in the recommended scenario n = 2, 20.8% of the ASes need to update their
PALs during the month. 9.8% of the ASes need to only one PA change in the month, 5.8% need 2 to 4 PA
changes, 2.8% need 5 to 10 PA changes. However, a small number of ASes need more than 100 changes,
and AS 701 (UUNET) needs 5465 changes. For a large organization like UUNET (in this case), we believe
that this worst case3 of 5 465 updates is feasible. Table 5 in Appendix 2 lists the organizations which need
more than 100 PA changes in the month. We can see that those requiring many PA changes are large ISPs.
Exceptions are ASes 23311 and 26224 which are not large ISPs, but need 4924 PA changes. This is because
they peer with AS 701 and are randomly selected in our analysis to assert preﬁx ownerships for AS701.
We suggest that ASes should choose large ISPs (e.g., their upstream service providers) to assert preﬁx
ownerships for them since large ISPs usually have more resources and capabilities to respond to changes
more quickly. For example, AS 701 also peers with large ISPs, e.g., AS 209 (Qwest), 3356 (Level3) and
1239 (Sprint); for n = 2 it could choose any two of them as its asserting peers.
61- 101- 201- 301- 1001- over
# of PA Changes 1 2-4 5-10 11-30 31-60 100 200 300 1000 5000 5000 Total
n=1 # of ASes 1 650 824 392 215 56 19 20 1 0 1 1 3 179
(percentage) (9.1%) (4.6%) (2.2%) (1.2%) (0.3%) (0.1%) (0.1%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (17.6%)
n=2 # of ASes 1 767 1 052 513 267 86 30 31 3 3 2 1 3 755
(percentage) (9.8%) (5.8%) (2.8%) (1.5%) (0.5%) (0.2%) (0.2%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (20.8%)
n=3 # of ASes 1 864 1 217 602 365 106 28 37 5 3 3 1 4 231
(percentage) (10.3%)) (6.7%) (3.3%) (2.0%) (0.6%) (0.2%) (0.2%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (23.4%)
n=all # of ASes 1 270 1 865 1 930 2 748 2 476 1 819 744 56 20 1 951 429 15 308
(percentage) (7.0%) (10.3%) (10.7%) (15.2%) (13.7%) (10.1%) (4.1%) (0.3%) (0.1%) (10.8%) (2.4%) (84.8%)
Table 4: Projected number of ASes absolution number, and as percentage of all ASes requiring the speciﬁed preﬁx
assertion changes based on July 2004 Data. We recommend row n = 2.
6.3 Discussions
The timeliness of PAL updates is important to ensure service availability. PALs need to be updated and
distributed in a timely manner so that preﬁx ownerships can be veriﬁed using currently correct information.
To ensure that a peer of a given AS updates its asserted preﬁx ownerships for that AS in a timely manner,
a service agreement between them would likely be required, e.g., an extension to their existing agreements.
Since there is usually some window before newly delegated preﬁxes are actually used on the Internet, an
3This worst case assumes a separate update for each PA change. In practice, the actual number of updates might be considerably
less, e.g., if one update reﬂects a large number of PA changes.
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Figure 8: Projected Preﬁx Assertion Changes based on July 2004 Data (based on Figures 4, 7).
asserting peer should be required to update its PAL to include newly delegated preﬁxes of the asserted
peer within that delay window. Updates of preﬁx removals can be done with lower priority since they
would appear to have only relatively small security implications. PALs can be distributed with BGP update
messages in newly deﬁned path attributes [30], thus, they can be distributed as fast as announcements of
preﬁxes. PALs might also be stored in centralized directories [30]. However, a “pull” model might make it
challenging to decide how often centralized directories should be checked.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no similar study prejecting the number certiﬁcate updates per
AS required by S-BGP and soBGP. S-BGP has been evaluated for the requirements of storage, CPU, and
memory [28], but not certiﬁcate updates. We are not aware of any performance study for soBGP. Thus, it
is difﬁcult to directly compare psBGP with S-BGP and soBGP on their requirements of preﬁx certiﬁcate
updates at this time.
7 Related Work
Signiﬁcant research has been published on securing routing protocols. Perlman [39] was among the ﬁrst
to recognize and study the problem of securing routing infrastructures. Bellovin [5] discussed security
vulnerabilities of Internet routing protocols as early as 1989. More recently, Bellovin and Gansner [6]
discussed potential link-cutting attacks against internet routing. Kumar [32] proposed the use of digital
signatures and sequence numbers for protecting the integrity and freshness of routing updates. Smith et al.
[43] proposed the use of digital signatures, sequence numbers, and a loop-free path ﬁnding algorithm for
securing distance vector routing protocols including BGP. Thorough analysis of BGP vulnerabilities was
performed by Murphy [35].
The most concrete security proposal to date for addressing BGP vulnerabilities is S-BGP [28, 29, 42],
18which proposes the use of centralized PKIs for authenticating AS numbers and IP preﬁx ownership. The
S-BGP PKIs are rooted at RIRs, and parallel to the existing system of AS number assignment and IP ad-
dress allocation. AS PATH is protected using nested digital signatures, and the integrity of an AS PATH is
guaranteed.
soBGP [47] proposes the use of a web-of-trust model for AS public key authentication, and a centralized
hierarchical model for IP preﬁx ownership veriﬁcation. AS PATH is veriﬁed for plausibility by checking
against an AS topology graph. Each AS issues certiﬁcates listing all peering ASes. A global AS graph can
be constructured from those certiﬁcates. Thus, the existence (only) of an AS PATH can be veriﬁed.
Goodell et al. [19] proposed a protocol, namely Interdomain Routing Validator (IRV), for improving
the security and accuracy of BGP. Each AS builds an IRV server which is authoritative of the inter-domain
routing information ofthatAS.AnIRVcanquery another IRVtoverify BGPUPDATEmessages received by
its hosting AS.Improper preﬁx origination and AS PATHmight be detected by uncovering the inconsistency
among reponses from other IRVs. One advantage of IRV is that it supports incremental deployment since it
does not require changes to the existing routing infrastructure.
Kruegel et al. [31] propose a model of AS topology augmented with physical Internet connectivity to
detect and stop anomanous route announcements. Their approach passively monitors BGP control trafﬁc,
and does not require modiﬁcation to the existing routing infrastructure. Therefore, it appear easy to deploy.
In a rigorous study of preﬁx origination authentication, Aviello et al. [2] formalize the IP preﬁx delega-
tion system, present a proof system, and propose efﬁcient constructions for authenticating preﬁx origination.
Real routing information is analyzed for restoring the IP delegation relationship over the Internet. They dis-
cover that the current preﬁx delegation on the Internet is relatively static and dense, however, they also note
that it is extremely difﬁcult, if not impossible, to determine this delegation structure.
Listen and Whisper [45] are proposed for protecting the BGP data plane and control plane respectively;
they are best used together. The ﬁrst approach (Listen) detects invalid data forwarding by detecting “incom-
plete” (as deﬁned in [45]) TCP connections. Whisper uncovers invalid routing announcements by detecting
inconsistency among path signatures of multiple update messages, originating from a common AS but
traversing different paths.
Hu et al. [24] propose a Secure Path Vector (SPV) protocol for securing BGP. SPV makes use of efﬁ-
cient cryptographic primitives, e.g., authentication trees, one-way hash chains for protecting AS PATH. It is
shown that SPV is more efﬁcient than S-BGP.
8 Concluding Remarks
Different approaches have been taken by S-BGP and soBGP for addressing security in BGP. In essence,
psBGP combines their best features, while differing fundamentally in the approach taken to verify IP preﬁx
ownership. As no centralized infrastructure fortracing changes in IP preﬁx ownership currently exists, and it
would appear to be quite difﬁcult to build such an infrastructure, we suggest that the decentralized approach
taken by psBGP provides a more feasible means of increasing conﬁdence in correct preﬁx origination. We
also suggest that the certiﬁcate structure and trust model in psBGP has practical advantages. We hope that
our comparison of S-BGP, soBGP and psBGP will help focus discussion of securing BGP on the technical
merits of the various proposals. We also hope this paper will serve to stimulate discussion in the Internet
community about alternate design choices for securing BGP.
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Appendix 1: Issues with a Web-of-Trust Model
There is much debate on the architecture for authenticating AS public keys in the BGP community, and in
particular the pros and cons of using a strict hierarchical trust model vs. a distributed trust model (e.g., a
web-of-trust model). While a web-of-trust model is widely used within the technical PGP community for
authenticating user public keys, it is not clear if it is suitable for authenticating AS public keys in practice
due to a number of issues. Some of these are discussed below.
• Issue of Bootstrapping Trust. To bootstrap trust, some entities must be trusted for signing a certiﬁcate
binding an AS number to a public key. Top ISPs have been proposed for functioning as such trusted
certiﬁcate authorities [47]. However, their authority for signing AS public key certiﬁcates is at best
questionable, since only IANA/ICANN and RIRs have authority over AS numbers. Top ISPs may
be trusted for forwarding subscriber trafﬁc because of their large scale networks, but probably not
for authenticating AS numbers because that is beyond their jurisdiction. In addition, a top ISP may
be trusted by people within its geographic area, but may not be trusted by outside entities especially
those who might have conﬂicts of interest with them.
• Issue of Trust Transitivity. A web-of-trust model relies upon trust transitivity for expanding trust.
Given a chain of public key certiﬁcates, an entity must trust the signature on the ﬁrst certiﬁcate and
every intermediate certiﬁcate on the chain to trust the authenticity of the last public key. Given trust in
the ﬁrst entity, it is not clear why one should trust the downstream entities of the chain. For example,
in real life, it is well accepted that trust is not transitive.
• Vulnerable to a single bad party. A web-of-trust model is vulnerable to a single misbehaving party
involved in a certiﬁcate chain, essentially requiring the assumption that there is no single misbehaving
entity on a certiﬁcate chain. This seems to contradict to the threat model of many security proposals
(e.g., S-BGP, soBGP) which allow and try to resist uncoordinated misbehaving entities. Requiring
multiple signatures may be of little value in a web-of-trust model since a single misbehaving entity
may be able to obtain multiple trusted public key certiﬁcates [33, 41]. This is possible due to the fact
that in a web-of-trust model, no one has authority over (“owns”) the name space involved.
22Appendix 2: ASes with Top 40 Number of PA Changes
# of PA Changes AS Number Organization Name
17633 ASN for Shandong Provincial Net of CT
102 17773 CNNIC, China Network Information Center
6347 SAVVIS Communications Corporation
21578 Universidad autonoma de Bucaramanga
103 8054 Ticsa
106 19832 20twenty Financial Services [Pty] Ltd
11744 Investec Bank
107 6467 E.Spire Communications, Inc.
2905 The Internetworking Company of Southern Africa
108 5400 Concert European Core Network
25653 Pegasus Web Technologies
110 29791 Voxel.net, Inc.
112 19429 E.T.B.
118 174 PSINet Inc.
121 4323 Time Warner Communications, Inc.
122 30893 Glassbilen Networks
123 16150 Port80 AB, Sweden
124 8473 Bahnhof Autonomous System
125 2914 Verio, Inc.
126 4755 Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Autonomous System
129 724 DLA Systems Automation Center
130 9600 SONY CORPORATION
132 7303 Telecom Argentina Stet-France Telecom S.A.
22597 Synygy, Inc
141 30544 People First Federal Credit Union
145 286 KPNQwest Backbone AS
147 2497 IIJ
151 1785 AppliedTheory Corporation
154 7474 Optus Communications Pty Ltd
169 10026 IXNet Hong Kong Limited
187 3549 Global Crossing
4134 Data Communications Bureau
209 721 DLA Systems Automation Center
245 209 Qwest
330 3356 Level 3 Communications, LLC
341 7018 AT&T
447 1239 Sprint
23311 Hinda Incentives
4924 26224 PRE Solutions, Inc.
5465 701 UUNET Technologies, Inc.
Table 5: ASes with Top 40 Numbers of PA Changes based on July 2004 Data
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